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Abstract 
Ukuthwala, a mock abduction of a girl for the purpose of a customary marriage, has been 
subject to debate at both local and national level. This debate culminated into a South 
African Law Reform Commission Report on the practice of ukuthwala. However, the case of 
Jezile v S brings theory into reality, putting in stark relief the issues that surround this 
custom in a constitutional democracy. The Jezile case highlights the disjuncture between 
communities’ lived realities and the constitutional imperatives of the right to practice one’s 
culture, as well as the rights to equality and dignity, specifically for women and the girl child 
in the context of ukuthwala. Based on field research conducted in September 2015 and April 
2016 in Engcobo (where the ukuthwala was alleged to take place in Jezile), this article sets 
out the community’s views in the aftermath of the case. Highlighting the alienation of the 
community from the law, and the complexities in understanding consent, the article posits 
that much more needs to be done from the ‘bottom up’ to ensure gender equality and 
protection of the girl child from harm. 
 
1. Introduction 
We are also not happy with how government treats us. As people living in the rural 
areas, government see us as nobody. Government looks down at us as not being 
important. If you could compare Nvumeleni’s case with Oscar Pistorius’s case, Pistorius 
killed someone and was sent nced to 5 years. Nvumeleni was practising his custom and he 
was sentenced to 22 years.1  
 
Ukuthwala,2 described as the practice of ‘carrying off a girl for the purpose of entering 
into a customary marriage’,3 has been the subject of debate at both local and 
                                                          
1 Jezile’s family focus group discussions, 22 September 2015. 
2 A term used in isiXhosa and isiZulu, it is also known as ukweba umakoti in isiNdebele; tjhabisa in sePedi; chobediso in seSotho; 
tlhaka or tlhakisa in xiTsonga; taha or tahisa in tshiVenda. 
3 See definitions of the practice in RH Kaschula et al. ‘The Amaxhosa Ukuthwala Marriage Custom in Fact and Fiction: A  
Contemporary Critique’ (2013) 33 South African Journal of African Languages 143; L Mwambene & J Sloth-Nielsen ‘Benign 
Accommodation? Ukuthwala, “Forced Marriage” and the South African Children’s Act’ (2011) 11 African Human Rights Law Journal 
1; N Karimakwenda ‘Today it Would be Called Rape: A Historical and Contextual Examination of Forced Marriage and Violence in the 
Eastern Cape’ 2013 Acta Juridica, 339; M van der Watt & M Ovens ‘Contextualising the Practice of Ukuthwala within South Africa’ 
(2012) 13 Child Abuse Research: A South African Journal 11; D Mabasa ‘Ukuthwala: Is it All Culturally Relative?’ (2015) 28 De 
Rebus 136; South African Law Reform Commission ‘Revised Discussion Paper, Project 138: The Practice of Ukuthwala’ (2015) viii; D 
S Koyana & J C Bekker ‘The Indomitable Ukuthwala Custom’ (2007) 40 De Jure 139; T W Bennett Customary Law in South Africa 
(2004); K Rice ‘Ukuthwala in Rural South Africa: Abduction Marriage as a Site of Negotiation About Gender, Rights and Generational 
Authority Among the Xhosa’ (2014) 40 Journal of Southern African Studies 381; J C Bekker Seymour’s Customary Law in Southern 
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national levels.4 This debate culminated into a South African Law Reform Commission 
(SALRC) report which documents two years of discussion.5 However, the case of 
Jezile v The State6 brings theory into reality, putting in stark relief issues that 
surround this custom in a constitutional democracy. What the Jezile case does is to 
highlight the disjuncture between communities’ lived realities, notions of justice, and 
the constitutional imperatives of equality, particularly on women and the girl child 
in the context of ukuthwala. 
 
Using desktop and qualitative methods,7 this article goes behind the reported facts of 
the case to understand the context in which these facts took place, the community’s 
views and more importantly, how consent is deemed to take place in ukuthwala 
(namely consent to what, by whom and when)? By seeking out and highlighting the 
community’s views, we do not condone customs related to ukuthwala without the 
woman’s consent. However, we argue that the deeply held beliefs and views of the 
community must be seriously considered if attempts to address the challenges that 
come with ukuthwala are to succeed. 
 
The rationale for such an argument is a genuine concern about how law, ideology and 
social practice interact. In particular, we thought it important to put a cultural 
practice into a much broader context of a community8 that is trying to hold on to a 
cultural identity within a post-apartheid constitutional democracy. Specifically, 
following Trubek and Galanter’s lead,9  our research problematises the assumption 
made in a liberal legal model10 that rules are enough to guide behaviour, and that a 
social practice can be successfully modified by a simple change of rules or a court 
judgment. Instead, our research adopts Chanock’s ‘bottom up’ approach which, in part, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
Africa (1989). For literary representations of ukuthwala, see R H Kaschula ‘Six Teaspoons of Sweetness’ in South African PEN & J M 
Coetzee (eds) African Pens 2011: New Writing from Southern Africa (2011) 209; G Mlophe ‘Nokulunga’s Wedding’ in G Mlophe Love 
Child (2002) 64.  
4 See, for example, discussions in Karimakwenda ibid 339; Van der Watt & Ovens ibid; Mabasa ibid 136; C Monyane ‘Is Ukuthwala 
Another Form of “Forced Marriage”?’ (2013) 44 South African Review of Sociology 64; Mwambene & Sloth-Nielsen ibid 1 and J 
Prinsloo & M Ovens ‘Ukuthwala as an Aberrant Traditional Practice: The State versus Nvumeleni Jezile 2014 WCD’ 2015 Acta 
Criminologica 169. 
5 SALRC ukuthwala report (note 3 above). See also earlier attempts to criminalise ukuthwala in the Kwazulu-Natal, Draft White Paper 
on Ukuthwala and related practices as observed in the SALRC ukuthwala report (note 3 above) 11. 
6 Jezile v The State [2015] 3 All SA 201 (WCC). 
7 We use desktop research, first, to frame the problem that has led to the study. Secondly, we use literature in the end of the analysis as a 
basis for comparing and contrasting findings of the qualitative study (J Creswell Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed 
Methods Approaches (4th edn, 2014)). Adopting the advantages of qualitative methods of study by D Norman & Y Lincoln Handbook 
of Qualitative Research (2nd edn, 2000), we also see that the method is used to describe existing phenomena and current situations in 
responding to local situations, conditions and needs of the participants. Also, ethics consent was obtained from the Humanities and 
Social Research Ethics Committee of the University of the Western Cape (ethics ref no: HS/16/3/6, reg no; 12/1/21) and the Faculty of 
Law Ethics Committee of Rhodes University (19/01/2015). We therefore adhere to concepts of the research ethics and informed 
consent. All participants in this study were informed of the purpose of the study, their informed consent was obtained, and anonymity 
guaranteed.  
8 For the purposes of this article, we adopt the definition of community as ‘[t]he people who are living in one particular area who are 
considered as a unit because of their common interest, social group or nationality’. See Cambridge English Dictionary 
(www.dictionary.cambridge.org).  
9 D Trubek & M Galanter ‘Scholars in Self-estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the 
United States’ (1974) 4 Wisconsin Law Review 1062.  
10 See, for example, discussions on liberal legal models by R S Turner ‘Neo-Liberal Constitutionalism: Ideology, Government and the 
Rule of Law’ (2008) 1 Journal of Politics and Law 47. 
https://repository.uwc.ac.za/
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seeks to improve empirical knowledge about legal reality.11 This ‘bottom up’ approach 
is simply the idea, somewhat ironically, that focusing on the Constitution and rights 
guarantees may not be the best starting point to promote constitutionalism in this 
context.12 Instead, Chanock recommends a reflexive process where communities’ social 
experiences are understood and taken into account sufficiently to encourage not only 
symbolic but also systemic change.13 We think that understanding social practice is 
an essential starting point in the domain of customary law, and in particular, 
ukuthwala, since a failure to do so has arguably resulted in misunderstandings about 
key concepts,14 and directing reform efforts in the wrong direction. 
 
In this light, we start by describing the facts of the Jezile case with reference to both 
the reported judgment and the transcript of the Regional Magistrate’s Court 
hearing. Secondly, we highlight aspects of focus group discussions with the 
community, more particularly women, traditional leaders and the extended families 
in the area in which the Jezile matter originated. Thirdly, we consider the 
disjuncture and misinformation between the reported case and the community’s 
views. Finally, we reflect on whether current reform efforts will further enhance or 
undermine constitutional values. In view of the community’s beliefs around the values 
of ukuthwala, and their misconception that Jezile was convicted of ukuthwala rather 
than rape, the major question is whether the proposed reforms (discussed below) will 
further alienate the community from the justice system. We hypothesise that, without 
more, reform efforts may cement the community’s belief that the justice system is far 
removed from its reality, and is not representative of its needs. 
 
2. Context (description of the community) 
Engcobo15 is an area north of Mthatha in the Eastern Cape Province, forming part of 
the Chris Hani District Municipality. During apartheid, the area formed part of the 
former Bantustan of the Transkei. Today, the greater part of Engcobo consists of small 
rural villages (locally known as ‘lali’s’) on rocky and hilly terrain connected by dirt 
roads, and presided over by the authority of headman and traditional leaders. The 
villages surrounding Engcobo are generally small, impoverished areas, with outside 
                                                          
11 M Chanock ‘African Constitutionalism from the Bottom-up’ 4 <http://www.customcontested.co.za/wp-
content/uploads/2015/04/Chanock-PublicLecture-2015.pdf>. See similar approaches by I Shivji ‘Contradictory Perspectives on Rights 
and Justice in the Context of Land Tenure Reform in Tanzania’ in A An-Na’im (ed) Cultural Transformation and Human Rights in 
Africa (2002). 
12 Chanock ibid 4–5. 
13 Ibid. 
14 For example, the often crude translation of lobolo into ‘bride price’, and – as discussed below – consent in the context of ukuthwala. 
See A E Laiou ‘Introduction’ in A E Laiou (ed) Consent and Coercion to Sex and Marriage in Ancient and Medieval Societies (1993) 
vii, in relation to issues of consent in sexual relations generally. Laiou comments: ‘[W]hat matters deeply in one society [regarding 
consent] does not matter in another, and resemblances are sometimes real and sometimes superficial’. She also says (at vii) that ‘[a]ll 
societies place limits on individual consent, and some value it less than others; many societies accept a certain degree of coercion as 
valid. What varies, and therefore historically significant, is the weight that each society places on individual consent, the limits it 
imposes upon it, and the validity it recognises to measures or acts of coercion’. For a critique of the Constitutional Court’s dealing of 
‘consent’ in a de facto polygamous marriage, see H Kruuse & J Sloth-Nielsen ‘Sailing Between Scylla and Charybdis: Mayelane v 
Ngwenyama’ (2014) 17 PER/PELJ 1710.  
15 Derived from the isiXhosa term meaning ‘a green place next to a stream’.  
https://repository.uwc.ac.za/
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pit latrines and approximately half the area connected to electricity.16 The area claims 
the most youthful population, as well as the highest rates of poverty and unemployment 
in the Chris Hani District Municipality.17 It is to this area that Nvumeleni Jezile 
returned from Phillipi, a township in Cape Town,18 on or about December 2009 or 
January 2010 to find himself a wife according to the ukuthwala custom. 
 
3. Facts of the Jezile case 
It was common cause that Jezile returned from Phillipi to Engcobo with the intention 
to find and marry a virgin girl according to customary law.19 In January 2010 in 
Engcobo, he noticed a girl (14 years old) from his neighbouring village and informed 
her family that he had the intention to marry her. The girl was informed by a gathering 
of various male members of the two families that she was to be married20 and was 
taken to Jezile and his friends who, in the ukuthwala style,21  took her to the village of 
Jezile’s family. Following the successful traditional lobolo negotiations  by Jezile’s 
family and the girl’s family, the girl became Jezile’s customary wife.22 
 
Whilst these processes were underway, the girl was apparently desperately unhappy 
and ran back to her family a few days later. She first spent a night in the forest close to 
her family home and thereafter, upon instructions from her mother, hid at another 
home.23 The girl was later found and promptly returned to Jezile’s family home by 
her own uncles. At Jezile’s home, the girl was beaten by Jezile and his uncle for refusing 
to put on the amadaki clothing (traditional clothing for a new bride).24 Soon after she 
was returned, the girl and Jezile left for Phillipi, Cape Town.25 
 
Whilst in Phillipi, the girl refused to have sex with Jezile.  Jezile proceed to forcibly 
rape her whilst she was protesting, and while his brother held her down.26 At one 
incident of sex without her consent, the girl sustained an open wound as a result of 
the assault that Jezile made to subdue her.27 A short while after these incidents 
occurred, the complainant managed to escape from Jezile’s home to a nearby taxi 
rank. Two women assisted her to the nearest police station.28 
 
                                                          
16Statistics South Africa ‘Census 2011 Municipal Fact Sheet for Engcobo Local Municipality (EC137)’ 
http://www.localgovernment.co.za/locals/view/21/Engcobo-Local-Municipality#demographic .   
17 See <http://www.localgovernment.co.za/locals/view/21/Engcobo-Local-Municipality>. 
18 Philippi is one of the larger newer townships in Cape Town, South Africa. Approximately 191,000 people live in Philippi according to 
the 2011 Census numbers. For more information, see <https://census2011.adrianfrith.com/place/199033>. 
19 Jezile (note 6 above) paras 5-6. 
20 Ibid para 7. 
21 While we note that the court questioned whether Jezile’s conduct amounted to ukuthwala given that the trafficking and sexual assaults 
took place after the customary ‘marriage’ rather than before (Jezile note 6 above para 90), we recognise that Jezile relied on what he 
believed was the living form of ukuthwala in his community.  
22 Jezile (note 6 above) para 9. 
23 Ibid para 10. 
24 Regional Magistrate Court, Wynberg, Part 1 of 2, 27 (Appeal No: 7/14). 
25 Jezile (note 6 above) para 23. 
26 Ibid para 11. For similar experiences of women being held down for sex post-ukuthwala, see Karimakwenda (note 
3 above) 339–356, 349. 
27 Jezile (note 6 above) paras 11 and 98. 
28 Ibid para 26. 
https://repository.uwc.ac.za/
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Jezile was charged with the offences of three rape counts, human trafficking, assault 
with intent to cause grievous bodily harm, and common assault in the Wynberg 
Magistrates Court. What was in dispute before the court was:29 
 
1. Whether the girl willingly travelled to Cape Town with Jezile and stayed with 
him willingly until she fled. 
2. Whether she was trafficked to Cape Town for purposes of exploitation or abuse of 
a sexual nature, 
3. Whether  sexual  intercourse  took  place,  and  if  so,  if  this  was  with  the  girl’s 
consent, 
4. Whether the injury that she sustained to her leg was caused by Jezile.30 
 
On 13 February 2014, the Regional Magistrate’s Court found Jezile guilty of all the 
offences charged and sentenced him to twenty years imprisonment on the three rape 
counts, ten years imprisonment for human trafficking, six months’ imprisonment on 
the assault with intent to cause grievous bodily harm and 30 days imprisonment on 
the count of common assault. The court ordered that eight years of the sentence for 
human trafficking, as well as the sentences imposed for the two assaults, could be 
served concurrently with the sentence imposed for the rapes. Effectively, he was given a 
total of 22 years imprisonment.31 
 
On appeal, Jezile raised, as part of his defences, that he was in a customary marriage 
with the girl and it is an integral part of ukuthwala that the girl may not only be 
coerced, but will invariably pretend to object since it is required of her to at least do 
so.32 In light of the cultural defence raised, the High Court invited several 
organisations and experts33 on ukuthwala and customary law to assist as amici 
curiae.34 These organisations included the National House of Traditional Leaders, the 
Women’s Legal Centre trust, the Centre for Child Law, the Commission for Gender 
Equality, the Rural Women’s Movement, among others.35  The High Court concluded that 
Jezile’s convictions on both counts of assault were set aside but confirmed the 
                                                          
29 Ibid para 12. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid para 2. In contrast, Van der Watt & Ovens (note 3 above) at 23 observed that in 2011, the Lusikisiki Regional Magistrate Court 
sentenced a man similarly convicted on the same charges as Jezile, to 16 years imprisonment but the sentence was suspended for five 
years on condition that he did not commit the same offence. 
32 Jezile (note 6 above) para 52. 
33 Prof RT Nhlapo, a renowned expert on customary law, and author of several publications on the topic, who chaired the advisory 
committee that assisted the SALC in the development of the Discussion Paper in Project 138.  
34 See generally T W Bennett ‘The Cultural Defence and the Custom of Thwala in South African Law’ (2010) 10 University of 
Botswana Law Journal 3. For international comment on cultural defences in general, see A Phillips ‘When Culture Means Gender: 
Issues of Cultural Defence in the English Courts’ (2003) 66 Modern Law Review 510; D Evans-Prichard & A Dundes Renteln ‘The 
Interpretation and Distortion of Culture: A Hmong “marriage by capture” case in Fresno, California’ (1994–1995) 4 California 
Interdisciplinary Law Journal 1; L Volpp ‘Blaming Culture for Bad Behaviour’ (2000) 12 Yale Journal of Law and the Humanities 89; P 
Fournier ‘The Ghettoization of Difference in Canada: “Rape by Culture”: And the Danger of a “Cultural Defence” in Criminal Law 
Trials’ (2002) 29 Manitoba Law Journal 1; A Dundes Rente The Cultural Defense (2004). 
35 Also included were the Masimanyane Women’s Support Centre, and the Commission for the Protection of Cultural, Religious and 
Linguistic Communities. 
https://repository.uwc.ac.za/
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magistrate court decision with regard to the convictions and sentences for the offences of 
rape and human trafficking.36 
 
4. Community’s views on ukuthwala, the outcome of the case and the law 
As pointed out, this research is based primarily on  the  local  process  and  context issues of 
the Jezile case as seen through the lens of family and community. It is therefore important 
to stress the general themes that emerged from the focus groups which align with many of 
the issues that were raised in the Jezile case, specifically on ukuthwala, consent and the 
law. We seek to first highlight the community’s views on ukuthwala. Thereafter, we 
consider the implications for consent more generally. We then conclude this part by 
discussing the community’s perspectives on laws regulating consent and age requirements 
to a customary marriage. 
 
4.1. Ukuthwala 
In discussion, it emerged that ukuthwala continues to be a respected custom in the 
Engcobo area, particularly in that it is seen as promoting community values relating 
to social cohesion and solidarity amongst its members. This finding is similar to the 
findings by Van der Watt and Ovens and the Gender Directorate in  Lusikisiki, Eastern 
Cape.37 These studies also reported strong cultural support for the practice of 
ukuthwala among chiefs and parents.38 The community expressed the view that 
‘ukuthwala is a practice that they will continue to exercise regardless of the prevailing 
criticisms from different sectors’. Complementing the reasons given in the Van der 
Watt and Ovens study for the continued support of the practice, the community in 
Engcobo saw ukuthwala as promoting the following community values: longevity in a 
customary marriage;39 the prevention of children to born out of wedlock; respect 
between child and parent in families; ties within the community – between one family 
and another; and the affirmation of a continued cultural practice.40                         
Many of these values in ukuthwala are captured in the following sentiment expressed in 
one of the community focus group discussions: 
 
If you can look now, with the old and the new generation, the difference between wives in 
the old generation who were thwalaed and new generation, those who  were  not married by 
ukuthwala, there is a big difference, the one who has been thwalaed stay in their 
marriages, their marriages are stable, their marriages lasts, because she’s not just 
                                                          
36 Jezile (note 6 above) para 106. 
37 Van der Watt & Ovens (note 3 above) 11 and the SALRC Ukuthwala Report (note 3 above) 2, 14. 
38 Ibid (Van der Watt & Ovens) 16. 
39 This rationale appears to underpin Nhlapo’s comments regarding the community sense of belonging and socioeconomic 
circumstances when he writes: ‘In the context of a subsistence economy the very rules that appeared designed for the subjection of 
women often operated to ensure their security. The economic priorities underlying the pre-eminence of marriage and large families 
produced practices which worked in part to ensure that no woman was left without someone directly responsible for her maintenance’. 
See R T Nhlapo ‘The African Family and Women’s Rights: Friends or Foes?’ 1991 Acta Juridica 135, 144. 
40 This view concurs with academic commentary on cultural practices and identity. For example, Stilz explains: ‘Local customs and 
festivals are usually thought to be impressive and efficient demonstrations of indigenous identity. There is indeed something to be said 
in favour of their longevity, exactly because they are well-proven ways of gracing and making bearable the sombre cutting edges 
between life and death. A special birth rite, and initiation procedure, a wedding ceremony, a funeral, all placed at those incisive 
thresholds of life that beg for meaning, may reveal much about the particular world view of a community’. See Stilz quoted in J U 
Jacobs ‘Young South Africans and Cultural (mal)Practice: Breaking the Silence in Recent Writing’ (2013) 34 Literator 1, 2.  
https://repository.uwc.ac.za/
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married to her husband, but she is married to the whole family, she respects not only 
her husband but the whole family, the one who is not thwalaed disrespects the family 
because she’s married to her husband, she only focuses on her husband. That is why 
there are so many divorces now.41 
 
While the community was aware of reported abuse of the ukuthwala practice, they saw 
more value in its retention and blamed the abuse of the practice on the general 
breakdown of values and ‘problems’ in the community, including the following: 
 
i.A lack of respect between children and parents (‘Girls are cheeky now’42); 
ii.The abuse of alcohol and drugs by young men (leading to an abuse of  the custom); 
iii.Extra-marital relationships by women in the community (leading to, in the community’s 
view, a woman who has been thwalaed falsely accusing her new husband of rape 
because she wants to stay with her pre-existing ‘boyfriend’43); and 
iv.Continued schooling after the thwala (leading the girl/woman to turn away from her 
marriage; linking to (i) above).44 
 
4.2. Outcome of the Jezile case 
In general, there is a clear sense of a community in mourning, at pain, angry, and 
more importantly, in disbelief at the outcome of this case.45 All those who spoke in 
focus groups saw the case being squarely about an attack on their custom. Further, 
discussions with the community uncovered a variety of sentiments regarding the 
community’s highly ambivalent relationship with the justice system that convicted 
their ‘brother’ and ‘son’ (namely, Jezile). The community indicated their discomfort 
and alienation from the legal processes that took place in the Jezile case, with general 
support for the notion that the local courts would have decided the matter differently, 
given that local magistrates would have allegedly understood the practice.46 In the 
Jezile case, in particular, the community found the following issues alienating and 
challenging: 
 
i.The (geographical) distance to Cape Town (meaning that most of the family could 
not attend court proceedings). 
ii.The language spoken during the court process (meaning that neither Jezile nor the 
uncle (who was able to attend) fully understood the court proceedings. For example, 
the uncle was unable to tell the researchers whether he attended proceedings in the 
Magistrate’s Court or in the High Court when the matter was appealed.)47 
iii.Their belief that Jezile’s non-Xhosa legal representative did not understand the 
custom and, as such, could not properly represent him. 
                                                          
41 Women, chief and his delegates focus group discussions, September 2015. 
42 Women focus group discussions, September 2015. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Families of the complainant and Jezile focus group discussions, September 2015 and April 2016. 
46 Families of the complainant, Jezile, as well as the Chief and his delegates focus group discussions, September 2015 and April 2016. 
47Jezile’s family focus group discussions, April, 2016.  
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8 
 
iv.Their belief that the magistrate’s lack of knowledge and lack of understanding of the 
ukuthwala custom in the court a quo led to their brother being wrongly convicted. 
v.Jurisdiction  (why  the  matter  was  heard  in  a  court  in  Cape  Town  when  the 
ukuthwala proceedings occurred in Eastern Cape).48 
 
The sense of alienation, of the breakdown of community life and of culture is evident 
in the following two comments by community members: 
 
But we would like to say this affects us deeply, this hurt us, Nvumeleni is our child, our 
child who is in jail for a crime that we were also part of, because when he started his 
lobola, he came to us, we were part of the lobola negotiations from the beginning, why 
are you not arresting us? Why is he the only one serving a sentence in jail? He did not 
do this alone, he started this with his family, with his community, this is done 
regularly in this community, but now he is in jail alone.49 
 
You know when you talk about criminalizing ukuthwala, that hurts me deeply, we have 
a problem here, there’s a young man from our community who thwalaed a school girl, 
he’s now in jail, after the process was done, families met together, lobola negotiations 
were done, after that the girl went to lay a charge, we see him on TV, . . . this guy did 
everything right, but now he’s in jail’.50 
 
In expanding on the community’s views, we found the following themes evident as a 
result of the case. 
 
4.2.1. The idea of continuing consent/conjugal debt 
Both families could not understand how Jezile could be charged with raping his own 
wife.51 In the eyes of the family, consent to the marriage amounted to consent to sexual 
intercourse.52 The families’ views seem to align with Karimakwenda’s observation that 
under customary law ‘sexual assault was not consistently considered to be immoral, 
especially if it served a socially recognised purpose - such as precipitating 
marriage’.53 This view also aligns with research undertaken by Wood where she found that 
in practice, a woman’s lack of consent did not mean that forced sex was considered to 
be rape, and was, in fact, ‘part of the process’.54 
 
In explaining why they thought the charge was unfounded in the context of the Jezile 
case, family members pointed out that the complainant had shared a bed with Jezile 
                                                          
48 Jezile’s family focus group discussions, as well as the Chief and his delegates in September 2015 and April 2016 
49 Jezile’s family focus group discussions, September 2015. 
50 Women focus group discussions, September 2015. 
51 For a comparative view of the history of spousal exemption for rape, see N Swartz, et al. ‘Is a Husband Criminally Liable for Raping 
His Wife? A Comparative Analysis’ (2015) 3 International Journal of Academic Research and Reflection 8. 
52 Families of the girl and Jezile focus group discussions, September 2015 and April 2016. 
53 Karimakwenda (note 3 above) 349. 
54 K Wood ‘Contextualising Group Rape in Post-apartheid South Africa’ (2005) 7 Culture, Health & Sexuality 303, 313. 
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for at least two weeks in Engcobo before moving to Cape Town.55 The community felt 
that living together in this time denied the complainant the opportunity of alleging 
rape. Both families were generally uncomfortable with the thought of a husband 
asking his wife to have sex.56 These observations can be illustrated from the following 
two excerpts: 
 
In this case, she was thwalaed, there were lobolo negotiations, both families agreed, 
she came to stay with our family, for three months as a makoti. I wish the law could 
have mercy because I want to emphasise the part about rape, he did not rape her, he 
was following his custom. Her parents accepted the lobolo to show that they are 
agreeing with the marriage, she went home and her parents brought her back to our 
family.57 
 
To add more, I would like to plead with the law to have mercy … to look at the case 
differently, I suspect that maybe one of the family members of the girl who did not like 
the marriage got involved, fought this marriage in a different way and used this girl 
to lay a rape charge, but this is not rape, there is no rape in this case, you cannot stay 
with someone for over three months and later on claim that you were raped. I think 
someone in Cape Town got involved and convinced this girl to go and lay a rape charge. 
 
Jezile’s testimony during the trial generally confirms that he felt the same regarding 
marriage and sexual intercourse. When asked by the prosecutor: ‘As your wife did it 
mean that she had to do as you told her? Was she a subordinate to you? Did she have 
to listen to you as being your wife?’ Jezile’s response was ‘That is right, yes.’58 
 
4.2.2. Misinformation/lack of knowledge 
Almost two years after the appeal judgment against the conviction of rape, trafficking 
and assault was handed down, both families continue to hold mistaken beliefs on the 
case. These beliefs relate to the nature of the conviction. Jezile’s family thought that 
he was convicted of following his custom, ukuthwala.59 The complainant’s family 
thought  that  he  was  convicted  of  assaulting  the  complainant  as  a  result  of  a 
domestic argument.60 It was, therefore, clear that both  families  lacked  knowledge about 
                                                          
55 There was some debate about the time she spent in Engcobo before going to Cape Town. Neither the Magistrate’s Court Transcript 
nor the Appeal Court judgment are clear on the matter. 
56 Families of the girl and Jezile focus group discussions, September 2015 and April 2016, respectively. 
57 Jezile’s family focus group discussions, September 2015. 
58 Jezile (note 6 above) para 41. Also recorded in Regional Magistrate Court, Wynberg, Part 1 of 2, (Appeal No: 7/14), 66. In S v 
Mvamvu 2005 1 SACR 54 (SCA) 320 the Supreme Court of Appeal controversially took into account a similar view in determining a 
sentence on appeal. The court found that Mvamvu believed that he was still married to the complainant, and that (at para 16) ‘it was 
clear from his evidence that at the time of the incidents [of rape] that the accused honestly (albeit entirely misguidedly) believed that he 
had some ‘right’ to conjugal benefits’. The court went on to say that ‘[h]is actions, though totally unacceptable in law, might well be 
(albeit to a limited extent) explicable given his background’ and concluding by commenting that ‘[t]hese ingrained habits … cannot be 
ignored when considering an appropriate sentence’. While most commentators have been critical of the SCA’s view, it should be noted 
that the sentence in the court a quo in S v Mvamvu (five and three years for two rape convictions respectively) were replaced and the 
court imposed 10 years each for the two rape convictions, despite the court’s apparent sympathy for the accused’s beliefs. 
59 Jezile’s family focus group discussions, September 2015 and April 2016. 
60 Girl’s family focus group discussions, April 2016. 
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what offences Jezile was charged with, what he was convicted of, and why they deemed this 
fair/unfair. 
 
This is clearly in sharp contrast to what was reported in the judgment as follows: 
 
The Magistrate was however of the view that the matter was not about . . . ‘the practice of 
ukuthwala or forced arranged marriage and its place if any in our constitutional democracy. 
Rather, this case is about whether the state proved that the accused committed the 
offences he is charged with and if so, whether he acted with the knowledge of 
wrongfulness and the required intent. To this extent only, reference to the so-called 
marriage will be made from time to time.61 
 
4.2.3. Jurisdiction, language and legal representation 
In terms of jurisdiction, the community felt that the matter should have been heard in 
Engcobo and not in Cape Town, as that was a ‘white man’s court’.62 Had the matter 
been heard locally, the community felt that the result would have been different. The 
community opined that the magistrates in Engcobo would understand the situation 
and not see it as an offence. This was expressed as follows: 
 
And secondly it’s clear that the people who were presiding or involved during the court 
proceedings of this trial, that its people who are not familiar with ukuthwala or its 
their first time dealing with a case like this (ukuthwala case), the way this case has 
been publicised in TV, in papers, it’s all over the media like it’s something that is never 
heard of. Cases like this one are common in this area, but you don’t hear too much 
hype about them, because magistrates, prosecutors and defense attorneys who deal 
with these cases are familiar with and understands our customs, it’s not like it’s 
something new to them. It’s possible that his defence attorney had no idea of what 
ukuthwala is, it was something new to him, also in his eyes this was rape, it’s someone 
who does not understand our custom.63 
 
This view is fortified by the community’s suggestion that another magistrate rehear the 
case in the following two ways: 
 
Nvumeleni was following his custom, we would like to know if it’s possible that the case 
be re-opened and heard in Eastern Cape, to involve people who know about the custom, 
also we suspect  that the  magistrate presiding over the  case did  not understand our 
custom, we think that was a disadvantage for Nvumeleni or if the case cannot be heard 
in Eastern Cape, at least [the state should] change the presiding magistrate over the 
matter.64 
 
                                                          
61 Jezile (note 6 above) para 51. 
62 Jezile’s family focus group discussions, September 2015 and April 2016. 
63 The Chief and his delegates’ focus group discussions, September 2015. In the latter case, mention was made of the wound on her leg. 
64 Jezile’s family focus group discussions, September 2015 and April 2016. 
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Should they have taken people from here this case would have not turned out like this, 
who are these experts that they are talking about that gave evidence about our 
custom, because even us as Xhosa’s we practice custom in a different way, in here we 
do things differently to Mpondos and Bhacas.65 
 
Secondly, on the issue of legal representation, the Jezile family were concerned that a 
person who did not know or understand the custom of ukuthwala represented 
Jezile. In their view, this had a negative impact on the outcome of the case. This is 
illustrated by the following: 
 
You see in this case, culture has played an important role. You cannot come from a 
different culture and represent someone whom his charge is based from his cultural 
practice which you do not understand at all. That is why there is so much difficulty in 
this case. A Xhosa custom cannot be represented by a coloured person. The judiciary 
system should look at these kinds of cases and let people who understand that 
particular custom preside over the case.66 
 
Lastly, a relative who sat through the court a quo proceeding described that Jezile 
complained that he did not understand the proceedings because of language issues.67 
The community expressed similar sentiments, while also displaying a lack of 
understanding of court procedures, as follows: 
 
I think . . . if the court would have made an effort and got family members  of 
Nvumeleni who were involved in  the  beginning  and  ask  about  what  really 
happened, to understand that people are different, for instance the immediate 
family of Nvumeleni is not well educated, and maybe his answers during cross 
questioning were not fruitful, because he’s not  familiar  with  legal  terms  of  the  
courts.  I  think that was a disadvantage for him, also maybe his attorney  that  
represented  him during the trial was not  a  Xhosa  speaking  person,  someone  who  
does  not understand  our  culture.68 
 
4.2.4. The state against culture 
In discussions in the focus groups and with family, a shared community view emerged 
that the community’s custom and ways were not recognised nor protected by the state.69 
This is clear from the quote at the beginning of this article, and fortified by the views of 
family members. These family members further implied that, not only had their custom 
not been recognised, but that the state’s position was ‘confusing’70 and that their socio-
                                                          
65 The Chief and his delegates’ focus group discussions, September 2015. 
66 Jezile’s family focus group discussions, September 2015. 
67 Jezile’s family focus group discussions, September 2015 and April 2016. 
68 The Chief and his delegates’ focus group discussions, September 2015. 
69 Jezile’s family focus group discussions, September 2015 and April 2016. 
70 ‘Government is confusing us. We celebrate our heritage by marrying according to custom, we are criminals’. And, ‘To add on that, we 
are told that this month September is heritage month. So what are we supposed to celebrate? Because we celebrate our custom, we get 
into trouble. We go to prison. We get life sentences. Losing your life. Your future. By practising your custom. Government preaches that 
we should preserve our customs. We should go back to where we came from. But that gets us into trouble. Please look at this. These 
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economic circumstances had been imperilled as a result of the state’s stance against their 
practice: 
 
What really pains us is that Nvumeleni was the breadwinner of this family. He is the 
first born of this family. They do not have a father. He was the big brother that they all 
looked up to. The provider for the family. The only one who was working. He thought he 
was doing the right thing by getting married, building his family home but that 
landed him in jail.71 
 
Related to this aspect, is the community’s view that the state failed to send out a clear 
message to the community as to sexual conduct of children. The community 
appeared to feel that the state condoned sexual activity by children for certain 
purposes but not for others. This is illustrated in the following: 
 
What is your advice, here is the question: girls as young as twelve years claim grant 
money [ie. child support grants] for their children, which means government allows 
them to have children, meaning to engage in sexual activities, if they allow them to 
claim grant as young as they are, how come they don’t allow them to get married before 
eighteen years?72 
 
Apart from these sentiments, the community similarly viewed the outcome of the case 
as an attack on the community-orientated way of decision making which they clearly 
value as a social control mechanism and cohesion in the community. This is evident 
from the following two statements: 
 
This hurt us. Nvumeleni is our child. Our child who is in jail for a crime that we were 
also part of because when he started his lobolo he came to us. We were part of the 
lobolo negotiations from the beginning. Why are you not arresting us? Why is he the 
only one serving a sentence in jail? . . . This is done regularly in this community but 
now he is in jail alone.73 
 
I cannot sleep in the night. Someone’s child is in prison because of concluding a 
marriage. If she did not want Jezile, she should have just left him instead of this.74 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
laws are conflicting. It is confusing. They say practice this side but on the other hand they put you in jail. With Nvumeleni his whole life 
is gone. He was practising his custom but now his future is gone’ (Jezile’s family focus group discussions, September 2015). This view 
bears some similarity to J de Coninck’s concept of ‘bounded democracy’ in which he explains that, apart from elections, further 
engagement with the state is restricted by ignorance, fear or other forms of exclusion. See J de Coninck ‘Furthering an African 
Perspective on Social Justice: East Africa Social Justice Group’ in J de Conink, J Culp & V Taylor (eds) African Perspectives on Social 
Justice (2013) 3, 5.  
71 Jezile’s family focus group discussions, September 2015 and April 2016 
72 Women focus group discussions, September 2015. 
73Jezile’s family focus group discussions, September 2015 and April 2016.  
74 Girl’s family member, 28 April 2016. See also similar sentiments by Jezile (note 6 above) para 42 when he stated: ‘what I wanted 
from that of my heart is to get a wife and then to use the protocol, to do the right thing, involve the elderly people so that I can get a wife 
that I can stay with, not all there to play to. And I wanted to follow that tradition and do the right things and follow my father’s and 
forefathers, to do things according to our tradition’. 
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The collective conscious and collective responsibility of the community loom large.75 
 
4.3. Community’s perspectives and the Law 
The SALRC has reported on the various forms of ukuthwala which exist.76 From 
these various forms, it is clear that the Jezile case dealt with the following possible 
scenarios: (1) that the families agreed on the (potential) marriage without the girl’s 
knowledge or (2) the scenario that the girl would not have given consent, but the 
ukuthwala pressures her and her family into consenting. Two experts were led in the 
Jezile case, namely Professor de Villiers (in the court a quo) and Professor Nhlapo 
(in  the  appeal).  Both  sketched  the  requirements  of  ukuthwala.  The  court  accepted 
Nhlapo’s requirements as: 
 
the woman must be of marriageable age, which in customary law is usually considered to 
be child-bearing age; consent of both parties to perform ukuthwala; parties arrange a 
mock abduction; woman would be abducted and placed in the custody of women folk to 
safeguard her person and reputation; sexual intercourse between parties is  prohibited 
during this period; a family would then send an invitation to the woman’s family of the 
mock abduction which would be a signal that the man’s family wished to commence 
negotiations for their marriage; and that the woman’s family consent is pivotal to a 
customary marriage.77 
 
The traditional leadership in the community confirmed the above requirements as 
reflecting the community’s practice as follows: 
 
[L]et me explain how we understand the custom. When a young man is at the stage of 
taking a wife, he tells his parents that he wants to take a wife, the parents asks him 
whether he has someone that he wants to take as his wife, if the son says no, then he 
asks his parents to find him a wife. The family sends delegates (intlola -  inspectors) to go 
and look for a girl who is going to be the wife, they go to the family of the girl as visitors 
who are just passing. Through the casual talk with the girl’s family, they ask how many 
girls are in the family, and how old are they. During this visit they observe the family, 
what kind of family it is, whether parents instilled values and respect in bringing up their 
daughters. They also check things like livestock, farming to assess which of the things in 
the family is the potential wife interested in. If the intlola delegate is satisfied with the 
family that this family is a warm family that the girl is brought up  in  a respectful home 
they report back to the family of the son. Onozakuzaku delegates are then sent to the 
girl’s family to ask her hand in marriage, the girl  does  not  know anything about this. The 
discussion is between the two families (elders). The girl’s family will make a plan to get the 
girl be thwalaed, they send the girl with other girls to accompany her to deliver a letter a 
                                                          
75 See van der Watt & Ovens (note 4 above) 15. 
76 The four possible scenarios identified are: ‘the girl is aware of the plot and colludes with the lover; families agree on the (potential) 
marriage, with or without the girl’s knowledge; the girl would not have given her consent, but ukuthwala pressures her and her family 
into consenting; and ukuthwala as a solution for men and women who have remained unmarried for a long time’, SALRC (note 3 above) 
para 2.11. 
77 Note 6 above para 72. 
https://repository.uwc.ac.za/
14 
 
lali [rural area] where the husband’s family is, by then the son’s family is aware that the 
girl would be sent on an errand, that gives them a chance to send delegate to thwala her. 
When they all meet at a certain spot, (a river maybe) then the girl is thwalaed, during 
the ukuthwala process the others will act as though they don’t go along with the practice 
although they are aware that this is what is happening. The girl will then be surprised and 
start crying, that is why there is a saying that ‘a wife joins her in-laws crying’. The girl 
that is being thwalaed is seen as being ready to be  a wife, that she is ready to build a 
family. After  the girl arrives  at  the groom’s family, a delegate is sent to her family to tell 
them not to look for her as she has been thwalaed, even though they know her family 
knows that she was going to be thwalaed. The groom’s family then does the formal 
processes such as dressing her as a new makoti, doing utsiki for her. This is all done 
with/after the agreement between the two families.78 
 
Of particular interest is the first requirement that the woman must be of ‘marriageable 
age’. Both the traditional leadership and the Jezile family believed that the complainant 
was at least sixteen years old. They believed she lied to get the protection of the law. In 
justifying their views that she could not have been fourteen years old, the leadership 
and the family pointed out that she was in grade seven at the time that she was 
thwalaed. Given that the general age of children entering school was ten years old in the 
area, they opined that she had to be older than sixteen years. 
 
One family member noted that his daughter was fourteen years old and in grade two, 
while another spoke of his fourteen year old daughter being in grade three.79 
Notwithstanding their views of her age, the leadership and communities from both Jezile 
and the complainant’s village found the actual age of the girl child to be irrelevant, 
choosing rather to consider the onset of puberty (the ‘child-bearing age’) as an indication 
of readiness to be married. In accordance with their practice, both families agreed that 
that sexual maturity governed the marriageable age of the child rather than the age in a 
birth certificate.80 Given that the Jezile family knew she was in grade seven and looked 
sixteen, for them this was the determining factor, rather than her actual age.81 
 
The other requirement is that consent of both parties is necessary to perform ukuthwala. 
Particularly important is Nhlapo’s suggestion that the woman could be taken unaware of 
the decision and acquiesce in the process only after  the  fact.82 Nhlapo also suggested that, 
if the woman does not agree, the process fails and her father could institute a civil 
action against the man’s guardian.83 In the Jezile matter, the community put emphasis on 
                                                          
78 The Chief and his delegates focus group discussions, September 2015. 
79 Jezile’s family focus group discussions, September 2015. 
80 Jezile’s family focus group discussions, September 2015 and April 2016. See also similar observations by Karimakwenda, (note 3 
above) 342. In addition, consistent with Jezile’s family view on the issue of age and consent, Karimakwenda also reported from her 
study that ‘many African witnesses before the commission could not fathom the idea of a girl making a choice on her own. The 
witnesses stated that a girl must be obedient to her father so that she would then be obedient to her husband. See Karimakwenda (note 3 
above) 347.  
81 See also Monyane (note 4 above) 68 where he quotes a traditional leader: [F]or a girl to be taken as a wife through ukuthwala, the 
process has nothing to do with age. Culture has no age. Age is something that we learn today because of [our] Westernisation’. 
82 Jezile’s defence, Jezile (note 6 above) para 87. 
83 Jezile (note 6 above) para 72.2. 
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the fact that the complainant had stayed with Jezile for three months (or so they 
thought)84 and that if consent was in issue, she would have been able to voice this much 
earlier by going back to her family (since it was walking distance – at least for the rural 
nature of the place). The community held the view that her escape from Jezile while she 
was still in the village was part of the process. This process required or expected that the 
woman should show ‘mock resistance’ and that the family would formally escort her back 
on the receipt of three bottles of wine/beer.85 
 
The difficulty of the escape, for the law’s purpose, is of course to ascertain the true 
intention of the woman. Is she following custom (which would require her to feign 
running away for the process of ukuthwala) or was she truly running away (signalling her 
refusal to marry Jezile)? More importantly, running away obscures the ability for a court 
to determine when a woman actually does consent. The family members of Jezile 
thought it was the former instance, describing it thus: 
 
Running away is a common thing that is done by new brides. But if the family is in 
agreement with her, her family then take her back to her marital home. What I would 
like to explain further is that all the things that have been explained that took place (viz. 
the exchange of brandy etc.) do not happen if there is no agreement or acceptance of the 
marriage between the two families. For instance, the lobolo negotiations do not take 
place meaning no payment for lobolo the bride’s family do not accept the bottles of 
brandy . . . Both families have to be in agreement before lobolo could take place.86 
 
The family’s views are similar to what Jezile said in court that he was not unduly 
concerned when the complainant ran away in the Eastern Cape because: 
 
This is a normal thing, always when a makoti is a newly-wed, normally she does do 
those things of running away and coming back, running away and they bring her 
back, but when the time goes on, she settles down and stays.87 
 
Interestingly, both Nhlapo and Mahlangu (an expert from the House of Traditional 
Leaders who also gave an affidavit on appeal) held the view that the facts of the case 
did not amount to ukuthwala but a misapplied and aberrant form of the practice.88 
The experts gauged this to be the case through assessing the issue of the young age of 
the complainant, her lack of consent, and the fact that lobola was paid before the 
ukuthwala occurred. This did not differ with Jezile’s view that because requirements 
                                                          
84 Both the judgment and the community seem to lengthen or shorten this time without any objective clarity on the matter. While the 
community believed that the complainant stayed with the accused in Engcobo for three months, the judgment implies that the time was 
far shorter, but does not give a time line except to describe that ‘a few days into the marriage’ she ran away and was returned ‘two to 
three days later’ then the decision to go to Cape Town was made ‘shortly thereafter’. See Jezile (note 6 above) para 10. 
85 See also Jezile’s defence, Jezile ibid para 87. 
86 Jezile’s family focus group discussions, September 2015. 
87 Jezile (note 6 above) para 38. 
88 Ibid paras 76–77. 
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of lobolo, formal delivery of the girl by her family were met, he was in valid customary 
marriage with the girl, although it cast doubt on the ordering of acts.89 
 
5. Complexities and way forward 
5.1. Gap between communities’ lived reality and law 
In order to align ukuthwala with constitutional prescripts of equality and protection 
of human rights in general, several issues that unfolded in the Jezile case come to the 
fore. Perhaps the most troubling aspect of this case is, firstly, the gap between the 
communities’ lived realities and law reform. What clearly emerges from the 
community discussions, and from the case itself, is a lack of knowledge of the law 
requiring explicit consent and the age of majority, being a requirement for a 
customary marriage according to the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 
1998.90 This was expressed in the following: ‘Do you hold a community to a law that 
they do not know?’ and ‘All the laws are far from the community.’ Expressed both 
physically and metaphorically, their frustrations indicated a feeling that the law is far 
from the people: 
 
But all these laws that you are telling us about are still very far and new to us. They all 
happen in the cities. In the rural areas we know nothing about these things that you 
are telling us about today.91 
 
Now the problem is that this young man didn’t know that the girl was underage, he 
took her because he loved her, when was this law about age passed?92 
 
These expressions bear the characteristics of Ake’s warning many years ago that 
democratisation without recourse to social experience would lead to the ‘extreme 
alienation’ of people who would feel a ‘pervasive sense of helplessness amid a chaos of 
arbitrariness’.93 The community’s views that they felt alienated also comes through in 
the following observation: 
 
You know where the problem is, is that when they are doing their public hearings, they 
do not come down to us, to the rural areas where this ukuthwala custom is being 
practiced, they just go to the towns or cities where people don’t understand about this 
ukuthwala and get someone who read books to give inputs about our practice.94 
 
This is an important observation in the light of the SALRC report on ukuthwala. The 
SALRC explicitly limited its approach to desktop research, engaging with stakeholders 
and legislative analysis due to what it called ‘the obstacles to collecting data on the 
                                                          
89 Ibid para 86. 
90 See s 3 (1) (a) of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act, which came into effect on 15 November 2000. 
91 Jezile’s family focus group discussions, September 2015. 
92 Women focus group discussions, September 2015. 
93 C Ake Democracy and Development in Africa (1996) 178–80. See also Chanock (note 11 above) 5 and Shivji (note 11 above) 37. 
94 Jezile’s family focus group discussions, September 2015 and April 2016. 
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prevalence of ukuthwala’,95 a position which left out the communities in which 
ukuthwala is practiced.96 
 
The SALRC’s recommendation in the form of a Prohibition of Forced Marriages and 
Child Marriages Bill, that will criminalise ukuthwala without the consent of the 
woman involved, is certainly in line with the constitutional values of equality, dignity 
and freedom.97 However, looking at the methodology leading to the SALRC’s 
recommended Bill, there is a concern that the lack of community involvement in 
formulating a response to the ills of ukuthwala will hinder any efforts to curb the 
practice. 
 
In addition, the SALRC’s recommendation does not address the socio-economic 
realities in which these communities find themselves. Specifically, the general poverty 
and youth of the area,98 the age of school-going children,99 given the distances they 
need to walk, and the infrastructure (large rivers without bridges). More importantly, 
it appears as if the SALRC did not consider the values that the community attributed to 
the practice, whether in fact or in belief. While the SALRC focused on the difficulty of 
collecting data on the ‘prevalence’ of ukuthwala, we contend that empirical research 
on experience rather than prevalence would have been better suited for the task. We 
believe focus on experience would have alerted the SALRC to the issues mentioned 
in this paper.100 
 
As an example, a women’s focus group agreed that their main reason for supporting the 
practice was to ensure that women in general (and their daughters in particular) would 
not have children out of wedlock.101 In other words, they were afraid that the girl/woman 
may fall pregnant before being married, a slight in the community’s eyes.102 If the SALRC 
had understood that women, though affected by some of the challenges of ukuthwala, 
saw it as a means out of single parenting and underage pregnancy, then policy work on 
these ‘goals’ could have followed. In this context, recommendations as to contraception or 
campaigning for responsible sexual activity could be part of the solution. 
 
Despite this criticism against the methodology of the SALRC, we do not argue that the Bill 
is redundant, rather that much more work needs to be done on the contextual factors 
                                                          
95 See SALRC Ukuthwala Report (note 3 above) 3. 
96 We acknowledge that traditional leaders were invited to contribute and attend the meetings of the SALRC, but contend that location 
and resource challenges would have prevented many from attending the meetings. Also, we believe that hearing women directly is 
important in understanding the continued practice, women being the subject of violation. We also acknowledge that the SALRC relied 
on civil organisations experiences (ibid 3) but raise a concern that such empirical data may have been collected for a different research 
question than the one before the SALRC. 
97 Attached as Annexure A to the SALRC Ukuthwala Report (note 3 above). 
98 This is acknowledged in the SALRC Ukuthwala Report ibid paras 3.6 and 6.9 with reference to ‘poverty and financial strains’. 
99 See Monyane (note 4 above) at 66 where he refers to a lack of education as perpetuating ‘the cycle of gender inequality’. 
100 The SALRC does make mention that the committee took into account an ‘empirical survey’ completed by the CRL Commission at 
para 3.9. However, it appears that this survey focused on organisations dealing with ukuthwala rather than dealing with the community 
directly. 
101 Women focus group discussions, September 2015. 
102 The women suggested that marriage after 18 was ‘too late’ saying ‘that is why we thwala them’. 
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which impact the community.103 If communities see ukuthwala as a means to achieve 
certain values, then it seems obvious that one could look at alternative ways that those 
values can still be achieved, as mentioned above. 
 
In addition to the above suggestions and in the spirit of the bottom-up approach 
generally, we see the community’s expression of a lack of knowledge as ‘a democratic 
demand’104 to participate meaningfully on rule-making and constitutionalism 
generally.105 This demand can inform major recommendations on how to successfully 
implement new laws that are passed to address children and women’s rights violations. 
In this vein, a community member articulates this demand directly: 
 
[B]efore these laws are endorsed, they need to come to the traditional leaders, so that 
these laws could be discussed thoroughly, because we suspect that this law has been 
dealt/discussed by a white man, if I can say so. Or with people who don’t have any 
knowledge or idea of what ukuthwala is. Maybe the cabinet can invite in a conference all 
the traditional leaders and discuss this issue thoroughly, maybe then they can come with 
something portable.106 
 
If we do not take the community’s experiences seriously and find alternatives to the 
values that the community wishes to promote, we suspect that the practice will go 
underground rather than be put to an end where consent is found wanting. 
 
5.2. Law is not just a matter of law, it is also about justice 
Secondly, and more closely linked to the first point, is that law is not just a matter of 
law, it is also about justice.107 As observed by Chanock, it is indeed to the ‘content of these 
local reactions that we should look when thinking about [law reform] cultures and 
rights’.108 As noted previously, perspectives of justice and rights embedded in law are 
inconsistent to the communities’ lived realities. In the Jezile case it is clear that the 
communities felt alienated by the justice system, particularly in terms of the jurisdiction 
where the case was heard (being Cape Town), the state representative being non-Xhosa 
(a coloured lawyer) and a belief that the voice of the community was not heard through a 
witness to either the lobolo negotiations or the actual process of ukuthwala.109 If we 
accept that perception is just as important as fact for purposes of law reform, we need 
                                                          
103 See for examples, factors such as economic strain, lack of education and poverty. See Karimakwenda (note 3 above) 355. While 
focusing on mandatory minimum sentencing in relation to rape in South Africa, Baehr makes the point that ‘[r]eaching young men with 
economic development programs, access to alcohol abuse and substance abuse treatment, education reform and media campaigns … 
may prove to be more effective in reducing sexual violence in South Africa than mandatory minimums, or even a perfect justice 
system’. See K S Baehr ‘Mandatory minimums making minimal difference: Ten years of sentencing sexual offenders in South Africa’ 
(2008) 20 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 213, 246. 
104 See A van der Walt ‘Legal History, Legal Culture and Transformation in a Constitutional Democracy’ (2006) 12 Fundamina 1; see 
also G Carbone ‘Democratic Demands and Social Policies: The Politics of Health Reform in Ghana’ (2011) 49 The Journal of Modern 
African Studies 381 for descriptions of these demands in practice. 
105 Chanock (n 11 above) 5. 
106 Chief and his delegates’ focus group discussions, September 2015. 
107 M Constable ‘Law as Claim to Justice: Legal Histories and Legal Speech Acts’ (2011) 1 UC IRVINE Law Review 631. 
108 Chanock, as cited by F Banda ‘This One is from the Ladies: Thank you Martin Chanock, Honorary African Feminist’ (2010) 8 Law 
in Context: A Socio-Legal Journal 8, 11. 
109 Jezile’s family focus group discussions, September 2015. 
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to ask the same question as posed by Shivji in the context of land reform in Tanzania: 
‘Does the [suggested reform] embody the notions of justice, rights and fairness of the . . . 
people themselves or is it an expression of attempts to impose typical top-down 
bureaucratic approaches and notions of ‘administrative’ justice on the people?’110 
 
5.3. Complexity of consent in ukuthwala 
Thirdly, this research uncovers the complexity of the issue of consent in the context of 
ukuthwala. In trying to understand consent and its meaning in custom and outside of it, 
the following views from the community are instructive: 
 
I hear what you are saying but going back to the Jezile case. Let’s say that we agree on 
what you are saying about the provision [viz. the requirement of consent of the woman in 
the RCMA]. Now her parents had a discussion with her and she agrees to be thwalaed. 
Now later on, she changes her mind. Let’s assume this is what happened in this case. So in a 
case like that, who is to be blamed? Who is to be charged? At the beginning, she agrees to 
everything. Later on, she changes her mind. Who do we charge then?111 
 
Closely related to the above sentiments, are the views by the Chief and his delegates in 
the following: 
 
It’s common around here for a new makoti to go back home to visit her family, then her 
family brings her back, this is part of custom, what we call ukuphindindlela. To explain 
more about our custom, when a new makoti wants to do ukuphindindlela, she  runs 
away/go back home; this is a way of asking for ukuphindindlela, because she knows that 
her family would give her gifts to bring to her in laws.112 
 
Further complexities surrounding consent can be seen from the following: 
 
[I]n the olden days they were not asked, but now it’s different, families are different, 
some families talk to their children and come to an agreement, some force their children to 
marriage. But in this case, as the husband’s delegate, if the bride’s family says yes you can 
take her, we are agreeing to the marriage, we don’t ask for details as to whether you have 
talked to your daughter or, whether she agreed or not. And also, yes the girl would not 
agree if she was not in a relationship with the man. But if the both families agreed to the 
marriage, we then go for that. The communication is between the girl and her family, 
not direct from the husband’s delegate and the girl.113 
 
These comments all point to a local understanding of consent that is different to the 
accepted meaning of consent in the courts. While certain scholarship114 and experts115 
                                                          
110 Shivji (note 11 above) 37. 
111 Jezile’s family focus group discussions, September 2015. 
112 The Chief and his delegates’ focus group discussions, September 2015. 
113 Women focus group discussions, September 2015. 
114 Mwambene & Sloth-Nielsen (note 3 above). 
115 See, for example, Nhlapo in the Jezile case (note 6 above). 
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have commented on the necessity of the girl’s consent, other scholarship (and 
certainly this empirical research) implies that consent of the girl is not as important as 
the whole family’s consent. 
 
We posit this in considering a situation of what a family would do if the girl 
refused to marry upon request. Research116 points to power dynamics between family 
and girl where a response of ‘no’ would in all likelihood result in a threat of, or 
actual, harm. Even if we had to dispel actual harm as a result of a negative response, 
the girl child is faced with disobeying her parents or elders, thereby spurning cultural 
affinity and community belonging. So, the elements of coercion and duress feature 
prominently in any contextual understanding of consent in ukuthwala.117 The 
difficulties associated with consent are captured eloquently in the fictionalised short 
story account of a girl who is ukuthwalaed: 
 
They sit aside . . . under a weary old oak tree .  .  .  .  A place for men. A place of words, 
fluttering softly down, disappearing into the dry, red, cracked earth, a place of secrets. 
It is my fate that is being negotiated and sealed, but I know nothing of it. Though I 
can speak, I remain mute – one who does not speak, who is not spoken to. It is a debate 
about me, by men, for men.118 
 
6. Some implications for future research 
Our study presents a number of possibilities for future research. While we 
acknowledge the implicit effects of the Constitution on ukuthwala, future research 
could examine the communities’ views of what ukuthwala means in the light of the 
Constitution. We suspect that to understand the communities’ views of ukuthwala 
under the Constitution, we need to appreciate how different socio-cultural practices 
contribute to enhancing or diminishing communities’ value systems.119 Comparative 
research across different community groupings may be necessary in identifying these 
views. 
 
Second, future research could go further than we have been able to in exploring how 
different socio-groups view ukuthwala. We found some evidence of differences among 
groups, including, for example, a significant disparity between women and men 
respondents. We suspect there are particular reasons why women supported or did 
not support the practice that differs from men. For example, some of these women 
were also thwalaed before they got married. Second, as explained in part IV of this 
paper, women blamed the abuse of the practice on the general breakdown of the 
values in the community.120 If any of the two hypotheses helps to explain the differences 
between women and men views, then it is an empirical question that can only be 
addressed through subsequent research. 
                                                          
116 Prinsloo & Ovens 178 (note 4 above); Karimakwenda (note 3 above) 347–9. 
117 See also similar discussions by Karimakwenda (note 3 above), and Rice (note 3 above) 2014. 
118 Kaschula (note 3 above) 209. Our emphasis. 
119 See our discussion of values above together with Van der Watt & Ovens (note 3 above) 11. 
120 Women focus group discussions, September 2015. 
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Thirdly, future research might benefit from examining ukuthwala through other 
methodological approaches. We believe our research has captured the communities’ 
views in understanding the complexities of consent in the context of ukuthwala in the 
aftermath of the Jezile case. However, there are novel attempts to analyse how the 
communities react to specific issues of consent during the actual process of 
ukuthwala. 
 
Lastly, the question arises as to whether the Jezile case will make a material difference 
to community practice. Here again, our findings suggest that the case has had a 
negative impact in addressing the effects of ukuthwala on women and children’s 
rights. This is evidenced through the fact that community members view ukuthwala as 
a respected custom that must continue to be observed despite the Jezile case. 
Futhermore, both family members of Jezile and the complainant held more sympathy 
with Jezile’s incarceration than with the complainant’s experience. We, however, 
suspect that the impact may be more than what we have been able to identify in this 
study. 
 
7. Conclusions 
The discussion with the community, on the customary practice of ukuthwala and 
the Jezile case, highlight several issues as we have mentioned, including contradictory 
perspectives on the notions of justice and the constitutional imperatives of equality, 
particularly on women and the girl child. Clearly, these contradictory views highlight 
that reform efforts will have limited success ‘as long as we still suffer under the 
paradigms of liberal legalism where we think that changing rules is enough’.121 The 
SALRC and courts’ efforts (as shown in the Jezile case) to address the challenges that are 
associated with ukuthwala are laudable, but this research – we believe – shows that 
these efforts are not enough. Much more needs to be done in terms of understanding 
why practices, which appear archaic and patriarchal to outsiders, continue. We need 
to understand the legitimate cultural goals which the community wishes to achieve, 
and seek alternative means to achieve them. While public participation and 
engagement with the community will not necessary resolve post-colonial tensions, it will 
allow communities to have their voice heard.122 We also believe that it could potentially 
improve law reform efforts by bringing a dynamic to the law reform table. That 
dynamic, not often utilised, is the ability of customary law – through its people (not 
just traditional leaders) – to remake, remodel and reconstitute itself in the light of 
societal changes.123 
                                                          
121 Trubek & Galanter (note 9 above). 
122 Sen observes that ‘[o]pen-minded engagement in public reasoning is quite central to the pursuit of justice’. See A Sen The Idea of 
Justice (2009) 390. See also Baehr’s discussion (note 103 above 216 and 244) that harsher sentencing and perfect criminal justice 
systems do not necessarily (and in fact in South Africa – at least in relation to harsher sentences) lead to a reduced incidence of rape. 
123 See, for example, Karikmakwenda (note 3 above 356) who urges that we should not see culture ‘simply as an obstacle to change’, 
instead (and quoting Merry) Karikmakwenda suggests that culture has capacity to ‘innovate, appropriate, and create local practices’. See 
also S Hall ‘Cultural Identity and Diaspora’ in J Rutherford (ed) Identity, Community, Culture, Difference (1990) 222, 225, who argues 
that cultural identity is based on differences and discontinuities rather than on fixed essences, and that it is a ‘matter of “becoming” as 
well as “being”’. 
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